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Abstract
The article examines the implications of big data for competition law, with a focus 
on personal data and the privacy concerns that such data may give rise to, especially 
in the area of merger control. Today, one of the biggest challenges for competition 
authorities in data-driven markets is how to deal with issues related to personal data 
and the protection of privacy in their analysis. A key question is the role of competi-
tion law in protecting consumers from potential data privacy risks arising in the con-
text of mergers in digital markets. The article also engages with one of the currently 
most debated topics in the competition community, namely the competition-privacy 
interface, and considers how personal data in the digital economy is considered a 
currency in exchange for online offerings, and how a loss of privacy can be factored 
into quality competition. The article addresses some of the challenges with incorpo-
rating privacy as a non-price parameter into competition analysis and offers food for 
thought by discussing relevant methodologies to assign monetary values to personal 
data.
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I. Introduction
Competition debates associated with big data have long been on the agenda of com-
petition authorities around the world. A few years back already, the EU Competition 
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Commissioner described ‘competition in a big data world’ as a new antitrust frontier,1 
and it is commonly acknowledged that data can be a source of market power.2 Now, 
the discourse on competition in data-driven markets has encountered privacy issues 
and run headlong into the world of data protection.
This is not really surprising. Although collection and analysis of data by companies 
is not limited to consumer data, many aspects of big data are targeted specifically at 
consumers. As noted by the European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘[n]ot all big data 
is personal, but for many online offerings which are presented or perceived as being 
“free”, personal information operates as a sort of indispensable currency used to pay 
for those services.’3
Data is the price consumers pay for access to various online offerings and to plat-
forms like Facebook and Google. How that personal information is treated by busi-
nesses is becoming a competition issue. While competition law ‒ according to 
conventional thinking ‒ is interested in data due to its economic value, data protection 
rules deal with personal rights, but not necessarily the market value of data. Never-
theless, the value that individuals assign to the protection of their personal data is of 
great importance to businesses, the legal community, and policy makers.4
As the amount of information about users and their preferences gathered by busi-
nesses is rapidly growing, the impact of data as a factor in competition analysis 
attracts increasing attention.5 At the same time, the new EU legal framework concern-
ing data privacy, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), has brought 
data protection to the forefront of public discussion. Consumers’ views on the value 
of personal data are also shifting in the wake of the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica 
scandal in which data from 87 million Facebook users was illegally harvested from 
the platform for electoral manipulation, now prompting citizens to wake up to their 
data rights and acknowledging the value of data protection.6 The scandal pushed the 
power of digital platforms and privacy protection, along with political implications, 
to front pages around the world. Moreover, it has fuelled intellectual discourse and 
public engagement with the complex and highly fascinating intersection between 
competition law and data privacy.
Personal data is closely linked to the dignity, autonomy and privacy of individuals. 
The collection and use of personal information gives rise to issues concerning the 
1 Margrethe Vestager, Competition in a Big Data World, DLD 16 (Munich, 17 January 2016) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competi
tion-big-data-world_en> accessed 5 March 2019.
2 Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, 11 (10 May 2016).
3 European Da ta Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Preliminary Opinion, Privacy and Competitive-
ness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay Between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer 
Protection in the Digital Economy, 6 (March 2014).
4 Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K John, and George Loewenstein, What is Privacy Worth? 42 The 
Journal of Legal Studies 249 (2013).
5 French-German joint report (n 2), 11.
6 The scandal has led to wider concerns about Facebook’s entire applications ecosystem and data 
processing practices. MLex Comment, ‘Regulatory scrutiny of Facebook data-sharing won’t be limited 
to Cambridge Analytica privacy breach’ (22 March 2018).
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protection of users’ (informational) privacy. In this context, an emerging question is 
the role of competition law in protecting consumers from potential privacy risks. This 
is a hot topic both in the field of antitrust and merger control, especially with the 
increasing number of mergers in digital markets and so-called killer acquisitions, 
whereby companies acquire innovative targets with the purpose of pre-empting future 
competition. The broader policy question concerning the interlinkage between com-
petition and data protection is one of the most debated questions among competition 
law practitioners, policymakers and academia right now, and also an overarching 
theme of this article.
This article aims to take part in such debate and policy discourse. The article exam-
ines how concerns arising from accumulation of data and deterioration of privacy 
protection may be relevant for competition analysis, especially with regard to merger 
review. The article is structured as follows. Following the introduction, the second 
section introduces the emergence of big data and privacy issues in competition law, 
with a focus on personal data and the concerns that such data may give rise to. The 
third section analyses an emerging privacy dimension in merger review by looking 
at assessment of certain data-focused merger cases in digital markets. Next, the fourth 
section explores the challenges with weighing in and incorporating privacy as a non-
price parameter or element in competition analysis. The article examines how per-
sonal data in the digital economy is considered both a currency in exchange for online 
offerings, and how a loss of privacy can be factored into quality competition. Finally, 
the fifth section considers a potential way forward for the challenges of dealing with 
personal data and privacy by discussing some relevant methodologies to estimate or 
assign monetary values to personal data. The article ends with some concluding 
remarks. Throughout the article, the interlinkage between competition and data pro-
tection law is one important theme.
II. The Emergence of Big Data and Privacy Issues in Competition Law
Increasingly, we conduct our lives online. To do this, we grant access to our personal 
information. During the past decade, companies such as Facebook, Amazon, Alibaba 
and Google (Alphabet) have sprung up and become powerful by collecting and sell-
ing user data. Facebook is described as ‘the company responsible for the largest and 
most brazen data-collection project in human history’.7 These data-driven businesses 
occupy an increasingly important role in the modern economy and no doubt have they 
brought about significant new innovation and benefits for consumers. Digitalization 
offers tremendous potential for improving people’s quality of life, for doing business 
more efficiently, and for creating revolutionary business models.
7 Jake Bittle, ‘A Mark Zuckerberg Presidency Isn’t Ridiculous – It’s Terrifying’ The Nation (18 
August 2017) <https://www.thenation.com/article/a-mark-zuckerberg-presidency-isnt-ridiculous-its-ter
rifying/> accessed 5 March 2019.
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But the emerging number of businesses that achieve extremely significant turnover 
based on a business model involving collection and commercial use of personal data 
has also spurred discussions about the role of data and its protection in economic 
relationships, as well as in the application of competition law to those relationships, 
in particular as regards the assessment of data as a factor in establishing market power. 
Instead of talking about monopolies in the traditional sense, the concept of data-
opolies is emerging in public discourse to describe the so-called tech giants with 
significant market power based on data.8
“Big data”, a concept originally used by computer scientists and today popularized 
among academics, regulators and politicians, is widespread across multiple industries, 
sectors and disciplines. However, the term has no single definition and is used in dif-
ferent ways.
What the concept basically tries to do is to capture recent developments in digital 
technologies and data-driven markets. Big data is often described as an accumulation 
of a significant volume of different types of data, produced at high speed from mul-
tiple sources, the handling and analysis of which requires new and more powerful 
processors and algorithms.9 Big data is often also characterized by four Vs: the vol-
ume of data, the velocity at which data are collected, used and disseminated, the 
variety of information aggregated and the value of the data.10 The value of big data 
increases with the rise of “big analytics”, including algorithms that can access and 
analyse vast amounts of information, and the introduction of machine learning.11 It is 
important to note that data is of course varied and can be divided, roughly speaking, 
into personal and non-personal data.12 The GDPR provides a very broad definition of 
personal data as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual 
(“data subject”)’.13
This article is part of a larger public debate over whether modern competition 
policy should be updated for the age of digitalization and big data. According to The 
Economist
8 Maurice E Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Data-Opolies? 2 Georgetown Law Technol-
ogy Review 275 (2018).
9 See e.g., French-German joint report (n 2), 4-5. 
10 See e.g., Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, Virtual Competition ‒ The Promise and Perils of 
the Algorithm-driven Economy, 15 (Harvard University Press 2016).
11 See e.g., Ezrachi and Stucke (n 10), 15.
12 Data is another concept lacking a common definition. In a narrower sense, the term is often used 
for the results of scientific experiments or measurements. But in a wider sense the concept is used 
to refer to (any) information, or the representation of such information, often in combination with it 
being stored on a computer. See e.g., definitions according to Merriam-Webster <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/data> and Oxford dictionaries <https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
learner/data>.
13 Regulation (EC) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data [2016] OJ L 119, 4(1).
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[d]igital information is unlike any previous resource; it is extracted, refi ned, val-
ued, bought and sold in different ways. It changes the rules for markets and it 
demands new approaches from regulators.14
Whether the data economy, new technologies and evolving business practices require 
rethinking of competition law and policy is debated not only in public media but also 
the leading competition authorities in Europe and the USA are currently exploring 
these questions. In the end of last year, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) held 
a series of public hearings with the aim of analysing, among other, whether big tech-
nology companies have grown too big and wield too much power.15 Citing former 
FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, who held hearings of similar kind in 1995, the agency 
noted that its concern is the state of American antitrust (and consumer protection) law 
and development in digital markets, considering technology networks, market power 
and entry barriers featuring online platforms, and issues concerning the use of big 
data.16
The European Commission is conducting a similar exercise in the EU through its 
consultation on shaping competition policy for the digital age.17 Similarly, in the 
United Kingdom, the government is reviewing the impact and market influence of 
powerful digital technology companies and the possible need to adjust competition 
policy accordingly.18
Indeed, one of the most challenging issues for competition authorities in the digital 
economy is how to deal with the role of data and privacy on the other side of the coin. 
Data represents a core economic asset with the potential to create significant com-
petitive advantage for companies.19 The value of data lies, among other things, in the 
fact that it enables or facilitates an understanding of human behaviour by revealing, 
for example, patterns of information that allow companies to follow user behaviour 
and preferences, target their products and services accordingly and thereby monetize 
those services and products.20
14 The Economist, Fuel of the Future: Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy (London, 6 May 
2017). 
15 US FTC Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, Hearings on 
Competition & Consumer Protection, Public comment topics and process, available at <https://www.
ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/public-comment-topics-process#1>. See also Gene Quinn, ‘Has Big Tech 
Finally Become Too Big for the FTC to Ignore?’ IPWatchdog (21 June 2018) <http://www.ipwatchdog.
com/2018/06/21/big-tech-finally-become-big-ftc/id=98598/> accessed 5 March 2019.
16 Ibid.
17 European Commission, Call for contributions, Shaping Competition Policy in the Era of Digiti-
zation (12 July 2018).
18 HM Treasury, The Economic Value of Data: Discussion Paper 17 (August 2018).
19 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Supporting Investment in 
Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innovation, 319 (2013). The World Economic Forum has categorized 
data as a “new asset class” in its report Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class (Janu-
ary 2011).
20 For example, in its study on the commercial use of consumer data, the UK competition authority 
found that consumer data can in some business sectors ‘be a key competitive asset in targeting offers’ 
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Companies are adopting business models with personal data as a key input and 
strategies to acquire a data advantage over rivals. As these companies with their data-
driven business models strive to obtain a competitive advantage, they often look for 
opportunities to gain a data advantage through mergers and acquisitions.21 When 
companies in digital markets merge, it can lead to a significant increase in the scope 
and magnitude of consumer data under the control of a single company. While this 
can bring about innovation and enhance consumer welfare, it may also raise privacy 
risks and concerns about consumer harm.
The challenge is that, conventionally, competition authorities have an economic 
focus in their competitive analysis that centres on the price effects of a transaction, 
but looks less at other, non-price, dimensions. The risk with this price-centred 
approach is that it could lead to some anticompetitive mergers being approved uncon-
ditionally, with a significant future cost potentially imposed on consumers.22
As noted above with regard to the efforts by the FTC and the European Commis-
sion, competition authorities are increasingly recognizing the importance of data in 
the digital economy, and are also actively contributing to the debate and addressing 
the issue through published reports, investigations, and sector inquiries.23 One of the 
most notable examples of this development is the German Bundeskartellamt’s dom-
inance case against Facebook opened in 2016.24 The case concerns the interlinkage 
between data and market power, and whether Facebook is abusing its market power 
by infringing data protection rules.25 According to the preliminary finding in Decem-
ber 2017, the social network’s breach of data protection amounts to abuse of a dom-
inant position,26 and the recent final decision on 6 February 2019 confirmed this view.27 
The decision by the Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from making the use of its 
social network by users conditional on the collection of user and device related data 
because collecting and analysing consumer data is key to gaining an accurate understanding of how 
to attract and retain customers. The UK Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of 
Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information, 38, 2.88 (CMA June 2015). 
21 EDPS, Report  of Workshop on Privacy, Consumers, Competition and Big Data 1 (11 July 2014).
22 OECD, Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era 17 (29-30 November 2016).
23 Especially the German and French competition authorities have focused on competitive conditions 
in the digital economy and the role of data. In 2018 the German authority conducted a sector inquiry 
into online advertising (see press release, Bundeskartellamt Launches Sector Inquiry into Market Con-
ditions in Online Advertising Sector (1 February 2018). This was followed by the French authority also 
conducting an online advertising sector inquiry and publishing the results in 2018, see Autorité de la 
concurrence, Avis n°18-A-03 portant sur l’exploitation des données dans le secteur de la publicité sur 
interne (6 March 2018).
24 Bundeskartellamt press release, Bundeskartellamt Initiates Proceeding against Facebook on Sus-
picion of Having Abused Its Market Power by Infringing Data Protection Rules (2 March 2016).
25 Ibid.
26 Bundeskartellamt press release, Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding: Facebook’s 
Collection and Use of Data from Third-Party Sources is Abusive (19 December 2017). 
27 Bundeskartellamt press release, Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data 
from Different Sources (7 February 2019).
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and combining that information with the Facebook user accounts without the users’ 
consent.28
This case is breaking ground in the interface between competition and privacy. It 
will surely raise many questions among competition law practitioners and policymak-
ers and one of the most striking aspects of the German precedent is that it is entirely 
based on an infringement of European data protection rules enshrined in the GDPR. 
No doubt this case severely blurs the line between data protection and competition 
law.29 But the Bundeskartellamt’s case against Facebook is interesting and important 
in many ways, one being that so far, competition authorities have not been successful 
in explaining why privacy is a competition issue. Here, the German regulator makes 
it clear with its theory that Facebook’s dominance is what allows it to impose on users 
contractual terms that require them to allow Facebook to track them all over. Another 
way of looking at it is that when there is a lack of competition, users accept terms of 
service that they perhaps would not in another situation, which is not truly consent-
ing. The user consent may even be viewed as a fiction.
The case is not yet over, however, as Facebook is appealing the German decision.30 
The final outcome of the case will certainly be of outmost interest to both the com-
petition and privacy community and its implications may be far-reaching, touching 
also upon societal, political and even democratic perspectives. Moreover, if Facebook 
loses the appeal, Germany may become a grand experiment in whether the surveil-
lance economy is actually needed for the operation of social media.31
When considering the emergence of big data and privacy issues in competition 
law, a significant piece of guidance document is the joint report by the French and 
German authorities on competition law and the role of data in economic activities.32 
The study correctly notes that technological changes to the digital economy have 
revolutionized opportunities to collect, process and commercially use data in almost 
every business sector. While this may improve products and services and raise eco-
nomic efficiency, the study warns that the collection and use of greater volumes of 
data may also raise competition concerns.33
For example, one concern with data in the field of merger control is that combining 
the datasets of two merging companies could give them an unfair competitive advan-
tage if the combination of data prevents competitors from replicating the information 
28 Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary: Facebook, Exploitative Business Terms pursuant to Section 
19(1) GWB for Inadequate Data Processing (15 February 2019).
29 Jakob Kucharczyk, The German FCO’s Facebook Case: Blurring The Line Between Competition 
and Data Protection Enforcement, The Disruptive Competition Project (8 February 2019).
30 See Facebook’s blog post responding to the ruling, ‘Why We Disagree With the Bundeskartel-
lamt’ (7 February 2019) <https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/02/bundeskartellamt-order/> accessed 5 
March 2019.
31 Emily Dreyfuss, German Regulators Just Outlawed Facebook’s Whole Ad Business (7 Febru-
ary 2019) <https://www.wired.com/story/germany-facebook-antitrust-ruling/> accessed 5 March 2019.
32 French-German joint report (n 2).
33 French-German joint report (n 2), 9.
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extracted from it.34 In the words of the EU Competition Commissioner, ‘[t]he problem 
for competition isn’t just that one company holds a lot of data. The problem comes 
if that data really is unique, and can’t be duplicated by anyone else.’35 This kind of 
thinking is reflected in the essential facility theory in competition law.
Another concern with data is that the merged entity could increase the price at 
which it sells its data post-merger. It might also refuse to supply such data, for exam-
ple to exclude competing providers of data analytics services, who rely on data as an 
input for providing their services.36 Further, possible data-related competition 
restraints may arise from a merger of two companies already holding strong market 
positions in separate upstream or downstream markets in the form of market foreclos-
ure for new competitors.37
In the context that data has been identified as the currency of the internet38, an 
increase in the collection of personal data can be compared to a price increase.39 In 
so-called two-sided markets, products are offered to users for free (the “free” side) 
and monetized through targeted advertising (the “paying” side). Crucially, personal 
data is the price paid by consumers in return for receiving the “free” product.40 Data 
is a critical element to both these sides. Arguably, the price effectively paid by con-
sumers is their loss of privacy.41
This loss of privacy extends beyond the usual advertising breaks or banner ads, as 
personal information and search entries are analysed by data mining software, pos-
sibly involving a much higher degree of intrusiveness. The European Data Protection 
34 Ibid, 16.
35 Margrethe Vestager, speech, Making Data Work for Us, as part of Data Ethics event on Data as 
Power (Copenhagen, 9 September 2016).
36 Eleonora Ocell o and others, What’s Up with Merger Control in the Digital Sector? Lessons from 
the Facebook/WhatsApp EU Merger Case 1 Competition Merger Brief 5-6 (February 2015).
37 French-German joint report (n 2), 16.
38 As long ago as in 2012 Commissioner Reding observed that ‘[p]ersonal data is the currency of 
today’s digital market.’ Viviane Reding, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the 
Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age at Innovation Conference Digital, 
Life, Design (Munich, 22 January 2012). In the recent Google Search case, the Commission noted that 
‘Google’s flagship product is the Google search engine, which provides search results to consumers, 
who pay for the service with their data’ (emphasis added). Commission press release, Commission Fines 
Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own 
Comparison Shopping Service (27 June 2017). 
39 OECD Big Data (n 22), 18.
40 The vast majority of online service providers use a two-sided, or multi-sided, business model, 
whereby the service is offered at zero price to attract users, with online advertising generating the 
revenues necessary to fund the free service and make a profit. A flourishing doctrine exists on two- or 
multisided markets, see e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided 
Markets 1 Journal of the European Economic Association 990 (2003); David S Evans, Multi-sided 
Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market Power for Internet-Based Firms, Uni-
versity of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 753 (2016); David 
S Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution and Privacy 37 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (April 2009). 
41 OECD Big Data (n 22), 18.
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Supervisor (EDPS) has observed that, with the rise of big data and big analytics, 
‘companies are able to move beyond “data mining” to “reality mining”, which pen-
etrates everyday experience, communication and even thought.’42
In addition to having this sort of monetary value, privacy has also been recognized 
as a non-price dimension of competition in the sense that companies can compete to 
offer greater or lesser degrees of privacy protection.43 A degradation or loss of privacy 
can be viewed as a reduction in the quality of a product or service, in particular to 
consumers who value privacy highly.44 It follows that, when viewing privacy as a 
quality dimension of a product, if an online service provider, post-merger, were to 
start requiring more personal information from its users or supplying their data to 
third parties as a condition for offering its “free” product45, this could be seen either 
as a price increase or as a degradation in the quality of the product.46
It follows that in merger control cases, privacy might be relevant from a competi-
tion standpoint if a company benefits from strong market power in its relationship 
with end-users. This market power can be measured by the extent to which the com-
pany can engage in conduct ‘without some benefit to consumers that offsets their 
reduced privacy and still retain users.’47 A company that gains a powerful position 
through a merger may then be able to reinforce its market power by collecting more 
consumer data.48
Here, one possible concern is that the aggregated data resulting from a merger, 
when subjected to increasingly powerful big data analytic tools, may produce espe-
cially revealing pictures of consumers. In turn, this makes data breaches more far-
reaching and raises the risk that data will be used to the disadvantage of consumers.49 
Further, if two horizontal competitors compete on privacy as an aspect of product 
quality, their merger could be expected to reduce quality.50
42 EDPS, Towards a New Digital Ethics: Data, Dignity and Technology Opinion 4/2015 6 (11 
September 2015).
43 Ocello and others (n 37), 6; Howard Shelanski, Information, Innovation and Competition Policy 
for the Internet 161 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1663, 1688 (2013); Maureen Ohlhausen 
and Alexander Okullar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and the Right (Approach) to Privacy 80 
Antitrust Law Journal 36 (2015).
44 Lisa Kimmel and Janis Kestenbaum, What’s Up with WhatsApp? A Transatlantic View on Privacy 
and Merger Enforcement in Digital Markets 48 Antitrust (2014).
45 The supply of data to third parties would have to consider applicable data processing restrictions 
that follow from relevant data protection law, such as the GDPR.
46 Ocello and others (n 37), 6.
47 Shelanski (n 44), 1689.
48 Ibid. 
49 Kimmel and Kestenbaum (n 45), 48.
50 French-German joint report (n 2), 24, citing the UK Competition and Markets Authority, The 
Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information, 95 (CMA 38, June 
2015).
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III. Issues Regarding Data and Privacy in Digital Market Merger Cases
Competition risks related to data and privacy in digital market mergers have to some 
extent been examined in the past by competition authorities. Ever since the 2008 
merger case of Google/DoubleClick51, which received significant public attention and 
caught the attention of privacy advocates, the debate on the relationship between 
competition and privacy in the context of data has been ongoing. Now the debate has 
become somewhat polarized in that there are those who strongly advocate competi-
tion enforcement to prevent consumer harm in the form of privacy of consumers52, 
whereas others see data as just another type of input or strategic asset, and view pri-
vacy concerns as falling outside the scope of intervention by competition enforcers.53 
In what follows, competition assessments in certain key merger cases dealing with 
the role of data and privacy will be examined.54
As we shall see, a gradual change is identifiable in the approach to a potential pri-
vacy dimension in merger cases when looking, for example, at the competition 
analysis in Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp55, compared to Microsoft/
LinkedIn56 in 2016 and Apple/Shazam in 201857. In the former cases, the Commission 
dismissed concerns related to privacy and held that privacy harms from the increased 
concentration of data resulting from the transaction were outside the scope of com-
petition law.58 In its review of Microsoft’s acquisition of LinkedIn, however, the 
51 Case COMP/M.473 1 Google/DoubleClick, C(2008) 927. 
52 Allen P Grunes and Maurice Stucke, No Mistake About It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the 
Era of Big Data, University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No 269 (2015); Allen P Grunes 
and Maurice Stucke, Debunking the Myths Over Big Data and Antitrust, University of Tennessee Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 276 (2015).
53 See e.g., Darren S Tucker and Hill B Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data 3 Antitrust 
Source (December 2014); Daniel Sokol and Roisin Comerford, Does Antitrust Have a Role to Play 
in Regulating Big Data? in Roger Blair & Daniel Sokol (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, 
Intellectual Property and High Tech (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Geoffrey A Manne and Ben 
Sperry, The Problems and Perils of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into an Antitrust Framework CPI 
Antitrust Chronicle (2015). For a comprehensive list of literature reflecting both sides of the debate, see 
Cyril Ritter, Bibliography of Materials Relevant to the Interaction of Competition Policy, Big Data and 
Personal Data (29 September 2016) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2845590> 
accessed 5 March 2019.
54 A few words on terminology. The concepts of “privacy” and “data protection” are used inter-
changeably in this article. However, it is important to recognize that even though the two concepts are 
overlapping, strictly speaking they are also distinct from each other. While data protection law covers 
informational privacy, it does not incorporate all aspects of privacy, such as intrusions on physical 
seclusion, for example. Further, “privacy” does not capture certain aspects of data protection law, such 
as unconditional application to personal data in the public domain, or the rights it grants, e.g., rights 
of access to data, data security standards and the right to data portability. For elaboration on the link 
between data protection and privacy, see Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law, 
90 (Oxford University Press, 2015).
55 Case COMP/M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp, C(2014) 7239.
56 Case COMP/M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn, C(2016) 8404. 
57 Case COMP/M.8788 Apple/Shazam, Commission decision of 6/9/2018, not yet reported. 
58 See e.g., Commission press release, Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition of WhatsApp by 
Facebook (Brussels, 3 October 2014).
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European Commission approved the deal only after Microsoft offered certain com-
mitments, including securing competitors’ access to certain data. In this merger case, 
the Commission explicitly noted that data privacy is an important component of com-
petition.59 When commenting on the merger, the EU Competition Commissioner held 
that ‘by getting commitments from Microsoft that will keep the market open, we’ve 
helped to allow companies to compete to protect privacy more effectively.’60 In Apple/
Shazam, the Commission’s focus was on the uniqueness of data, i.e. whether the 
integration of Shazam‘s and Apple‘s sets of user data would give the merged entity 
a unique advantage.
i. TomTom/Tele Atlas
Even ten years ago the Commission already recognized the important competitive 
implications of data in its review of TomTom’s acquisition of Tele Atlas.61 T omTom, 
a manufacturer of portable navigation devices and navigation software, acquired Tele 
Atlas, which was one of the main suppliers of navigable digital map databases, a key 
input for such navigation devices and software. In its review of the transaction, the 
Commission considered the competitive advantage of data in digital map markets. 
While ultimately clearing the merger, the Commission noted that the merged entity 
would likely have the ability to exercise market power, but lacked the economic 
incentives to do so.62
In this case, the dimension of privacy was considered and the Commission noted 
that ‘confidentiality concerns can be considered as similar to product degradation in 
that the perceived value of the map for PND manufacturers would be lower if they 
feared that their confidential information could be revealed to TomTom’.63 According 
to the Commission, confidentiality concerns as to the customer information in ques-
tion could lead to reputational damage and customers considering switching prod-
ucts.64 Here, privacy was looked at as a sort of quality component in the competitive 
assessment of the merger.
ii. Google/DoubleClick
In Google/DoubleClick, personal data was, probably for the first time, analysed as an 
asset in a merger.65 At the time of the merger, DoubleClick was the leading provider 
of an ad-serving technology, which targeted ads and monitored their performance, 
59 Commission press release, Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, 
Subject to Conditions (Brussels, 6 December 2016).
60 Margrethe Vestager, What Competition Can Do – And What It Can’t at Chilling Competition 
Conference (25 October 2017).
61 Case COMP/M.4854  TomTom/Tele Atlas, C(2008) 1859.
62 Ibid., 230.
63 Ibid., 274-276.
64 Ibid., 274-275.
65 Google/DoubleClick (n 52). Joaquín Almunia, Competition and Personal Data Protection, at 
Privacy Platform Event: Competition and Privacy in Markets of Data (Brussels, 26 November 2012).
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whereas Google (today Alphabet), besides being active in online search, provides 
online advertising space and collects large amounts of personal data.66 The merger 
aimed to “combine not only the two firms’ products and services, but also their vast 
troves of data about consumer behaviour on the internet”.67 During the merger review, 
several market operators and civil society groups challenged the merger on the basis 
of privacy.
According to privacy advocates and opponents of the merger, the mere combina-
tion of the two companies’ assets, especially personal data, would allow the merged 
entity to achieve a market position that could not be replicated by competitors and 
would lead to their progressive marginalization and foreclosure.68 For example, pub-
lishers and advertisers would have no choice but to have recourse to the merged 
entity.69 Especially in the United States, the potential data consolidation raised serious 
concerns in the privacy community, and a complaint was filed with the FTC objecting 
to the merger on privacy grounds.70
During the merger review, the effect of the increase in the amount of personal 
information obtained by the combined entity was considered. However, the merger 
investigation found that the combination of information on search behaviour and 
web-browsing behaviour would not give a competitive advantage in the advertising 
business that could not be replicated by other players that have access to similar web-
usage data.71 Besides, the agencies decided that Google and DoubleClick were not 
close actual or potential competitors in any markets for online advertising or services.
The agencies’ market definition has since been criticized as flawed in that the agen-
cies missed the point that other markets were involved, and they overlooked that the 
acquisition of DoubleClick may have strengthened Google’s position in the multi-
platform online advertising market.72 The merger was cleared unconditionally on both 
sides of the Atlantic, but in the United States the transaction saw one FTC Commis-
sioner write a strong dissenting opinion claiming that the merger threatened consumer 
privacy:
66 Commission press release, Mergers: Commission Clears Proposed Acquisition of DoubleClick 
by Google (Brussels, 11 March 2008).
67 Pamela Jones Harbour, Dissenting Statement in the matter of Google/DoubleClick (20 December 
2007).
68 Google/DoubleClick (n 52), 359.
69 Damien Geradin and Monika Kuschewsky, Competition Law and Personal Data: Preliminary 
Thoughts on a Complex Issue 2 Concurrences 12 (2013).
70 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, The Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center in the Matter of Google, Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc. (20 April 2007).
71 The Commission has relied on similar reasoning, where rivals’ access to data post-merger was 
considered sufficient despite concerns regarding large data pools creating entry barriers, in cases 
COMP/M.6314 Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV (Mobile Wallet JV), C(2012) 
6063; COMP/M.7023 Publicis/Omnicom, C(2014) 89, and COMP/M.7337 IMS/CEGEDIM, C(2014) 
1025.
72 See European Parliament, Challenges for Competition Policy in a Digitalized Economy Study 
for the ECON Committee, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Economic and Monetary Affairs 
54 (2015).
THE IMPLICATIONS OF BIG DATA AND PRIVACY [2019] EBLR 349
[i]f the Commission closes its investigation at this time, without imposing any 
conditions on the merger, neither the competition nor the privacy interests of 
consumers will have been adequately addressed.73
In the EU, the Commission, in its approval of the deal, made it clear that it assessed 
the merger only under EU competition law and that the decision was without prejudice 
to the obligations of the merging parties under privacy legislation.74
iii. Facebook/WhatsApp
The Commission largely echoed its Google/DoubleClick analysis in the subsequent 
review of online social networking company Facebook’s acquisition of mobile mes-
saging company WhatsApp, clearing the merger unconditionally in 2014.75 Here, the 
competition analysis focused on the market for advertisements and the potential harm 
to advertisers resulting from an increase in Facebook’s market power through 
increased data collection capability. The outcome of the Commission assessment was 
that even if Facebook were to collect and use data from WhatsApp for advertising 
purposes, valuable user data would remain available to competitors beyond Face-
book’s exclusive control.
However, the Commission did not examine whether personal data from end users 
may be collected to a greater extent due to the combination.76 This illustrates the chal-
lenges of examining the impact of a merger on two or multisided digital markets, 
where competition authorities at times consider the implications of a merger only on 
the advertising side, ignoring the impact on the free side, which may make consumers 
worse off. Here, the Commission considered the data concentration only on the adver-
tising side of the market but did not analyse whether consumers might be harmed if 
Facebook were to start collecting and using data from WhatsApp users. Concerns 
about Facebook holding a significant amount of data were dismissed as strictly a 
privacy issue, outside the scope of competition law.77
73 Pamela Jones Harbour, Dissenting Statement in the Matter of Google/DoubleClick (20 December 
2007) 1. Since leaving the agency, former Commissioner Harbour has continued to urge enforcers to 
develop a more sophisticated analytical framework for evaluating the antitrust implications of privacy 
and personal data, see Pamela Jones Harbour, The Transatlantic Perspective: Data Protection and 
Competition Law in Hielke Hijmans & Herke Kranenborg (eds), Data Protection Anno 2014: How To 
Restore Trust?, 225 (Oxford: OUP 2014); Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a 
Web 2.0 World: An Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets 76 Antitrust Law Journal 769 (2010).
74 The FTC in its closing statement also noted that ‘privacy considerations, as such, do not provide 
a basis to challenge this transaction’. However, the FTC explicitly recognized that privacy can be a 
non-price dimension of competition, and that the FTC has the authority to act where a transaction is 
likely to reduce competition on that basis. Kimmel and Kestenbaum (n 45), 48.
75 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 56).
76 Ibid., 164: ‘For the purposes of this decision, the Commission has analysed potential data con-
centration only to the extent that it is likely to strengthen Facebook’s position in the online advertising 
market or in any sub-segments thereof.’
77 Ibid.
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At the time, lively discussion, controversy and objections surrounded the merger 
review, as well as Facebook’s compliance with data protection rules and privacy. The 
Commission chose not to deal with the question whether merger clearance should be 
conditional on strict compliance related to data protection78, but stated, as it had in 
Google/DoubleClick, that any privacy-related concerns arising from the increased 
concentration of data as a result of the transaction fall within the scope, not of EU 
competition rules but of EU data protection rules.79 While it recognized privacy as 
one of many parameters of competition between consumer communications apps, and 
while noting that users increasingly value privacy and security, the Commission con-
cluded that most consumer communications apps on the market do not compete 
mainly on privacy features.80
During the merger review, Facebook had pledged that it would not merge the two 
user-bases. However, two years after being granted unconditional clearance, it started 
doing so in 2016.81 This development led the Commission to question Facebook about 
its privacy policy changes and Finally, in December 2016, the Commission sent 
Facebook a formal statement of objections for allegedly having provided incorrect or 
misleading information during the 2014 merger review.82 The outcome of the inves-
tigation was that Facebook received a hefty fine amounting to €110 million – the first 
time a company had ever been fined for disclosures since the entry into force of the 
2004 Merger Regulation.83 The Commission has stressed that the decision is unrelated 
to privacy or data protection issues84, holding that the fact ‘[t]hat they didn’t merge 
78 In its review of the merger in the United States, the FTC took another approach and sent a letter to 
the merging parties urging them to continue to honour the promises made to consumers with respect to 
WhatsApp’s privacy policies as well as public statements about privacy made when the transaction was 
announced. Failure to honour these promises could constitute deceptive or unfair practices in violation 
of the FTC Act. See Letter from Jessica Rich, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade 
Commission, to Erin Egan, Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook, Inc, and Anne Hoge, General Counsel, 
WhatsApp Inc (20 April 2014).
79 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 56), 164.
80 Ibid., 174.
81 When the acquisition was announced, WhatsApp told users that its messaging product and Face-
book’s existing Messenger app would continue to operate as standalone applications and the transaction 
would not change anything in terms of the treatment of personal data by WhatsApp. As a response 
to privacy concerns raised about the transaction at the time, Facebook’s Chief Executive Mark Zuck-
erberg was reported as proclaiming that Facebook was “absolutely not going to change plans around 
WhatsApp and the way it uses user data”. See Facebook, WhatsApp blog (19 February 2014) <https://
blog.whatsapp.com/499/Facebook> accessed 5 March 2019; WhatsApp blog, Why we don’t sell ads (18 
June 2012) <https://blog.whatsapp.com/245/Why-we-dont-sell-ads?> accessed 5 March 2019; Kimmel 
and Kestenbaum (n 45), 51.
82 According to the charges, the technical possibility of automatically matching Facebook users’ IDs 
with WhatsApp users’ IDs already existed in 2014, contrary to Facebook’s statements at the time. See 
Commission press release, Mergers: Commission Alleges Facebook Provided Misleading Information 
about WhatsApp Takeover (Brussels, 20 December 2016).
83 Commission press release, Mergers: Commission fines Facebook €110 million for Providing 
Misleading Information about WhatsApp Takeover (Brussels, 18 May 2017).
84 Ibid.
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data wasn’t the decisive factor when the merger was approved’,85 noting, however, 
that this ‘was still a part of the decision’86.
iv. Microsoft/LinkedIn
Data and privacy were central in the Commission review of Microsoft’s acquisition 
of the LinkedIn professional social network in 2016.87 Critics of the deal, such as 
internet software company Salesforce ‒ whose own bid to buy LinkedIn failed ‒ 
argued that acquiring LinkedIn would give Microsoft exclusive access to data on how 
the social network’s 450 million users interact. This, so the argument went, would 
create an unfair advantage over rivals through restricting access to that information, 
which pre-merger was only available to LinkedIn.88
The outcome of the Commission’s merger review led to commitments being 
required from Microsoft to protect competition between professional social networks, 
in three respects. Firstly, for five years, PC manufacturers and distributors can choose 
whether or not to install LinkedIn on Windows. Secondly, competing networks will 
continue to enjoy certain interoperability with Microsoft products. Thirdly ‒ and 
importantly ‒ competing networks will be granted access to data stored in Microsoft 
Cloud.89
In its assessment, the Commission considered the protection of privacy and explic-
itly noted that data privacy can be an important parameter of competition and a driver 
of customer choice.90 Accordingly, privacy can be taken into account in a competition 
assessment to the extent that consumers see privacy as a significant factor of quality, 
and the merging parties compete with each other on this factor. In this instance, the 
Commission concluded that data privacy, as an important dimension of competition 
between professional social networks on the market, could have been negatively 
affected by the transaction.91
85 Some have been doubtful of this: ‘[N]ow, it [the Commission] claims to have received “incorrect 
or misleading information” at the time. We dare say that the Commission was probably the only party 
actually misled […]’ and ‘it [the Commission] has merely bent over backwards to emphasise just how 
unrelated this new investigation is to its 2014 merger clearance decision.’ Rating Legis blog, ‘Merry 
Christmas, WhatsApp Users’ (23 December 2016) <http://ratinglegis.eu/en/eu-commission-looks-at-
facebook-whatsapp-deal-again/> accessed 5 March 2019. 
86 See n 85. 
87 Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 57).
88 Nick Wingfield and Kate Benner, How LinkedIn Drove a Wedge Between Microsoft and Sales-
force (New York Times, 5 November 2016). Also relevant for the case was whether Microsoft’s exclu-
sive use of LinkedIn’s metadata, in conjunction with artificial intelligence software under development 
by companies, including Microsoft, could give rise to an unfair competitive advantage. See Richard 
Waters, Data Mining: Microsoft-LinkedIn Deal Raises New Competition Concerns (Financial Times, 
3 November 2016).
89 Commission press release, Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, 
Subject to Conditions (Brussels, 6 December 2016). Competition authorities elsewhere, such as in the 
United States, Canada, Brazil and South Africa, approved the transaction unconditionally.
90 Microsoft/LinkedIn (n 57) 350, n 330.
91 Ibid.
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v. Apple/Shazam
In 2018, the Commission accepted referral requests from Austria, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden concerning the proposed acquisition by Apple of 
Shazam, a developer and distributor of music recognition apps for smartphones, tab-
lets, and personal computers. The Commission opened an in-depth merger investiga-
tion and in its assessment focused especially on potential anticompetitive effects 
coming from Apple’s access to commercially sensitive data about customers and 
rivals regarding digital music streaming services. The transaction was approved by 
the Commission after a careful review of the acquisition of commercially sensitive 
data sets, here Shazam’s user and music data. The Apple/Shazam case constitutes an 
important addition to the series of merger cases involving the use of customers’ per-
sonal data and contributes to the discussion on rethinking competition law in the 
digital economy.92 One takeaway is the challenge of assessing market power in the 
presence of non-monetary pricing.93 In its merger analysis, the Commission notes the 
inconvenience in using market shares as a proxy for market power in fast-growing 
sectors that are characterized by frequent market entry and short innovation cycles.94 
However, while acknowledging the inadequacy of market shares as a measurement 
of market power and recognizing the existence of a problem with its estimation of 
market power, the Commission does not conduct a more holistic inquiry that would 
lead to more solid conclusions.95
The Apple/Shazam case does confirm that data is market power and constitutes an 
important consideration in competition law. When commenting on the decision, the 
EU Competition Commission noted that
“Data is key in the digital economy. We must therefore carefully review transac-
tions which lead to the acquisition of important sets of data, including potentially 
commercially sensitive ones, to ensure they do not restrict competition.”96
As the above review of some data-focused merger cases illustrates, competition 
authorities’ traditional way of examining transactions is often through the lens of 
price competition. Authorities tend to avoid entering into deeper analysis of harm 
when such is harder to quantify, such as the impact of a merger on privacy. This 
price-centric approach and straightforward analysis may still work well when datas-
ets are acquired and fairly transferred, such as in TomTom/Tele Atlas, but the com-
petition analysis becomes more difficult in the context of more data-driven strategies 
where the product or service is free, or non-monetary, with the “cost” of consumer 
92 For an insightful discussion on the Commission decision, see Nicolo Zingales, Apple/Shazam: 
Data Is Power, But Not A Problem Here, Competition Policy International (December 2018).
93 Ibid., 5.
94 Apple/Shazam (n 59), para. 162. 
95 Nicolo Zingales (n 96), 5.
96 Commission press release, ‘Mergers: Mergers: Commission clears Apple’s acquisition of Shazam’ 
(Brussels, 6 September 2018).
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privacy. Google/DoubleClick serves as a good example of such a scenario and critics 
argued that the combination of the companies’ valuable sets of user information 
amounted to a significant reduction in the quality of the search product for the many 
millions of individuals with high privacy preferences.97
Another illustrative example is Facebook/WhatsApp. In this case, the Commission, 
years after its clearance decision, decided to take action against Facebook ‒ eventu-
ally imposing a heavy fine ‒ in connection with the combined entity’s privacy deg-
radations. In this regard, a question that arises is whether consumers would actually 
be better off today had the Commission also assessed the impact of the merger on the 
free side of the market, and considered the implications for consumers in addition to 
advertisers, which would have required an analysis that looks at possible possible 
negative effects on non-price parameters, such as privacy.
The answer to this question is not straightforward, especially as incorporating a 
potential privacy dimension into competition analysis is not without criticism. Oppo-
nents declare, for example, that privacy concerns are not within the scope of compe-
tition authorities’ powers.98
The Apple/Shazam case highlights this complex interaction of competition and 
privacy or data protection law. One of the specific concerns that led the Commission 
to open a second phase investigation was inextricably linked to data protection law, 
namely whether Apple could use information collected through Shazam in order to 
identify customers of Apple Music’ s rivals, and ultimately target them with advertis-
ing or marketing campaigns. The Commission’s assessment did not enter into any 
detail on the competition-privacy interface and whether data protection law prevents 
such targeting, an analysis which would depend on the specific conditions regarding 
personal data processing, as well as conditions on transparency and safeguards avail-
able to data subjects. The analysis contained in the Commission’s decision in this 
respect is limited to noting “without prejudice of the assessment by the competent 
data protection authorities” that Shazam’s terms of service and privacy notice “appear 
to inform” on processing of customer information that Shazam collects.99
The complex issue of the interlinkage between competition and data protection 
will be discussed in the following sections of this article. The focus of the next sec-
tion is on examining the challenges and practical limitations of incorporating privacy 
as a dimension of competition law. This is done by looking at some practical possi-
bilities of measuring potential privacy harms in competition analysis.
97 Peter Swire, Protecting Consumers: Privacy Matters in Antitrust Analysis (Center for American 
Progress, 19 October 2007).
98 Sokol and Comerford (n 54), 6.
99 Apple/Shazam (n 58), para. 231.
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IV. The Controversial Competition-Data Protection Interface and the 
Challenge of Weighing in Privacy
The interface bet ween competition and privacy is perceived as problematic partly due 
to the fact current competition law and policy is pre-dominantly centred on price 
competition. Some competition scholars and theorists even hold that without prices 
there can be no markets, and consequently no market power. An overly price-centred 
approach to competition risks overlooking significant welfare harms relating to non-
price dimensions of competition, such as privacy. This approach also denotes that 
competition includes both price and non-price parameters.
In this regard, it is worth recalling the basis of competition theory, namely that at 
its simplest, the benefits of competition are lower prices, better products and services, 
wider choice and greater efficiency. The main parameters of competition are thus 
price, quality, quantity, choice and innovation.100 Acknowledging that competition 
consists of both price and non-price elements, it is fundamental that one key non-price 
aspect of competition is quality. Quality is a key consideration ‒ in addition to price 
‒ for consumers when determining whether to buy a product or service.101 
In today’s online markets, where products and services are commonly offered to 
consumers at zero-price, competition is increasingly focusing on non-price elements, 
such as quality.102 Quality also fosters innovation and economic growth. As a broad 
notion, the concept of quality includes privacy protection and thus privacy can be 
viewed as a parameter of non-price competition.103 As noted by Ohlhausen and Oku-
liar, ‘privacy protection has emerged as a small, but rapidly expanding, dimension 
of competition among digital platforms’.104
Generally in competition law and specifically in merger analysis, competition 
analysis adopts a price-centric approach that focuses on factors that are easily mea-
surable, such as short-term pricing effects and short-term productive efficiencies.105 
This price-centric approach is not optimal in data-driven markets, where products and 
services are offered at zero price and consumers are used to not paying for products 
and services ‒ other than with their data.106 As illustrated above in the review of some 
100 See e.g., C-413/06 P Bertelsmann [2008] ECR 4951, para. 121, T-168/01 Glaxo [2006] ECR II 
2969, para. 106, and many other judgments, including C-413/14 Intel [2017] 632, para. 134.
101 OECD, The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis, 5 (28 October 2013).
102 See e.g., Case COMP/M.6281 Microsoft/Skype, C(2011) 7279, 81 (noting that ‘[s]ince consumer 
communications services are mainly provided for free, consumers pay more attention to other features’ 
and ‘[q]uality is therefore a significant parameter of competition’.
103 EDPS, Preliminary Opinion, ‘Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Inter-
play between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy’ 
(March 2014) 6. 
104 See Maureen K Ohlhausen and Alexander P Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and 
the Right (Approach) to Privacy 80 Antitrust Law Journal 133 (2015).
105 Maurice E Stucke and Allen P Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford University 
Press 2016).
106 Stucke and Grunes  (n 108), 107. See also Michal S Gal and Daniel L Rubinfeld, The Hidden 
Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, NYU Law & Economics Working Papers, 
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merger cases, data-focused mergers can differ from other more conventional mergers 
in that they raise concerns about degrading consumers’ privacy. In these cases, the 
potential harms are more difficult to quantify. However, this does not make them less 
significant. The challenge is to consider the intangible harm that comes from inva-
sions of privacy and to measure privacy as a harm in a competitive assessment.
Although price competitio n dominates competition analysis in the EU and the 
United States, it is worth recalling that the applicable legal framework and merger 
guidelines do not limit the competition authorities to focus only price effects in merger 
analysis. For example, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines expressly state that one 
of the effects to be analysed in merger control is the effect on quality, which effec-
tively places the harm caused by a reduction in quality on a par with an increase in 
prices:107
Effective competition brings benefi ts to consumers, such as low prices, high qual-
ity products, a wide selection of goods and services, and innovation. Through its 
control of mergers, the Commission prevents mergers that would be likely to 
deprive customers of these benefi ts by signifi cantly increasing the market power 
of fi rm s.108
Similar to the merger g uidance, guidance from the European Commission on the 
assessment of agreements and unilateral conduct also includes the notion of quality 
as a factor in competitive analysis. The Horizontal Guidelines set out how various 
kinds of cooperation agreements between actual or potential competitors can have 
negative or positive effects on product quality.109 The Vertical Guidelines contain 
similar guidance regarding distribution agreements.110 Besides, the General Guide-
lines concerning agreements contain guidance on how to assess quality improvements 
in analyzing efficiencies,111 and the Market Definition Notice provides information 
on how quality considerations can be relevant for defining the relevant product mar-
ket.112 Thus, the wording in the Commission’s various guidance documents as such 
goes to show that competition analysis can look beyond price-related harms and take 
Research Paper No. 14-44 (January 2015); John Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations 
164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149 (2015) (discussing how traditional antitrust theories 
and analytical frameworks have failed to develop an adequate response to zero-price markets).
107 OECD Quality Report ( n 103), 83.
108 Commission, Guideline s on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/03, 8. See also Commission, 
Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control 
of Concentrations Between Undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/07, 10.
109 Commission Guidelines  on the application of Article 101 of the of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, 1.
110 Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ [2010] C 130/01, 1.
111 Commission European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 
97.
112 Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purpose of Community competition law 
[1997] OJ C372, 5.
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into account the element of quality, which, as a broad notion, includes a privacy 
dimension.
It seems conceptually clear that the concept of quality includes privacy protection, 
and ‒ as discussed above in the context of Microsoft/LinkedIn and Apple/Shazam ‒ an 
intellectual shift has occurred in the European Commission’s approach to privacy and 
factoring in privacy as a quality factor in a case or merger. Also in praxis, competi-
tion authorities have noted the importance of quality as a competitive feature when a 
product or service is offered for free; that in instances where price is constrained, 
quality becomes more important.113 Nevertheless, while it may be conceptually clear 
that privacy can be an element in quality-based competition, the challenge lies in 
making this approach fully operational. The issue is that consumers attach widely 
different values to privacy, which confounds rigorous analysis. Even if most consum-
ers would probably agree that a reduction in product quality is undesirable (at least 
at constant prices), consumers will differ greatly in the value that they attach to pri-
vacy protection exceeding the legal standard that all service providers are obliged to 
respect.114
Another challenge with privacy as a quality dimension is that despite the impor-
tance of quality being recognized as an important competitive element and the legal 
framework allowing for non-price considerations in competition analysis, competition 
policy is often still driven by how competition affects price. Although recent deci-
sional practice reflects an awakening intellectual shift within the Commission and 
activities by national competition authorities signal increasing attention towards data 
privacy hams, the focus is still often on price impact in competitive assessment.
For example, when assessing a merger, the competition authorities inquire whether 
the transaction will likely give the parties the power to raise the price of the product 
or service price above competitive levels. The so-called Small, but Significant, Non-
transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test is used to assess customer reactions to a price 
increase in the range of 5 to 10 per cent by a hypothetical monopolist (also known as 
the hypothetical monopolist test).
A problem arises, though, since in the context of digital products or services that 
are offered to users for free, the SSNIP test cannot be applied, as noted by Commis-
sion officials in the setting of the Facebook/WhatsApp merger.115 This is because the 
practical implication of a zero price is that some of the standard tools of market defi-
nition and market power analysis break down as a pure mathematical matter: ‘5 per-
cent of nothing is nothing, and because the nature of the product may be such that the 
hypothetical monopolist would still find it profit-maximizing to price at zero.’116
In any eve nt, achieving a precise definition of quality for a given product is a com-
plex task in competition investigations for many reasons. These would include factors 
113 Microsoft/Skype (n 104)  81; COMP/M.5727 Microsoft/Yahoo C[2010] 1077.
114 Ohlhausen and Okuliar (n 107) 133.
115 Ocello and others (n 37), 3.
116 Stucke and Grunes (n 108) , 117, citing David S Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free 22 
Competition Policy International (Spring 2011).
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such as the subjective features that contribute to a perception of quality by customers; 
the multi-dimensional nature of quality; and the absence of measurable variables.117 
And even if some quality-related features are measurable, the overall perception of 
product quality is often based on a combination of several features.118 Therefore, 
assessing quality is often a complex and imprecise exercise in itself that involves 
weighing evidence which is often of a subjective nature, such as different customer 
perceptions.
As quality is often difficult to measure and define, quality considerations in prac-
tice are commonly assessed by means of customers’ and competitors’ views. These 
are collected during market investigations or as documentary evidence, such as inter-
nal analysis or in-house surveys. The possibility to use more exact quantitative tools 
is – in contrast to a price-centred assessment – more limited.119
In some cases, quality, or perceived quality, correlates with the price positioning 
of a given product or service. In other words, at times consumers assess quality using 
price as a proxy, in that you get what you pay for (a decrease in quality for a given 
lower price).120 The more customers perceive a product or service as being highly 
qualitative ‒ by way of its proper characteristics or by marketing ‒ the more they are 
willing to pay for it and the more the observed prices of the given products differ.121
Ezrachi and Stucke argue that competition authorities rely on several heuristics to 
circumvent the challenges they face in appraising quality. Instead of attempting to 
quantify the impact of a merger on quality, the agencies rely on heuristics concerning, 
for example, consumers’ ability to accurately assess quality differences and imperfect 
information flows regarding quality. The problem with heuristics is that they break 
down, because they fail to accurately reflect the relationship between competition and 
quality or to consider that market realities are more complex.122
In particular, problems arise with the heuristic regarding price correlation in digi-
tal markets with zero-price products and services.123 In these instances, personal 
information is exchanged for products or services that are free, or that do not reflect 
the value of the information. This creates a challenge in identifying at what point the 
requirement for consumers’ disclosure of personal data for online transactions ‒ with-
out improving them or lowering their price ‒ is commensurate with the value of the 
data, and is therefore anticompetitive. In other words, when does the price become 
too high.
117 OECD Quality Report (n 103), 78-79.
118 Ibid. Taking cars as an example, the number of measurable variables that customers may take into 
account when assessing quality is huge and quite complex, ranging from speed, emissions, acceleration, 
and consumption to the precise parameters of individual components.
119 Ibid.
120 Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, The Curious Case of Competition and Quality 3 Journal of 
Antitrust Enforcement 227-257 (2015).
121 OECD Quality Report (n 103), 79. For example, price levels can be indicative of the (perceived) 
quality positioning of brands, e.g., with watches, where luxury brands are several times more expensive 
than technically comparable “regular” watch brands.
122 Ezrachi and Stucke, Competition and Quality (n 123), 227-257.
123 Ibid.
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The EU Competition Commissioner has stated that consuming free services against 
disclosure of data ‘doesn’t have to be a problem, as long as people are happy that the 
data they share is a fair price to pay for the services they get in return.’124 This is not 
really helpful, though, as what constitutes a “fair” price, just like the concept of “fair-
ness”, is highly subjective and open to various interpretations.125 If the agreement to 
disclose and permit personal data processing had a price tag, it would fit more easily 
within the conventional competition law framework. But, because most online offer-
ings are free, price effects in the traditional sense are absent. Consumer decisions and 
preferences may reflect whether competition in the marketplace exists, but they can-
not determine whether certain behaviour is anticompetitive. For example, if consum-
ers are charged high prices as a result of a merger, they would still pay what they 
believe a product or a service is worth to them.126
Although the significance of quality and privacy as non-price parameters of com-
petition might be recognized, competition authorities may not currently have the tools 
and analytical schemes for assessing these non-price dimensions. Consequently, con-
siderations regarding quality and privacy are not always sufficiently present in current 
competition analysis. Due to the unfamiliarity and difficulty in measuring and apprais-
ing quality, little attempt has been made to quantify, for example, how mergers may 
lessen quality. To address this gap, it has been suggested that competition authorities 
would use the SSNDQ test, which stands for a Small, but Significant, Non-transitory 
Decline in Quality.127
However, for many products and services, quality attributes are of a subjective 
nature, complex and difficult to measure. Therefore, the test is in practice difficult, if 
not impossible, to apply, because of the lack of a single parameter that defines qual-
ity. For the SSNDQ test to work, the quality component would have to be measurable, 
objective, transparent and well accepted.128 The SSNDQ test may work in industries 
with well-accepted metrics of quality, such as health care. For example, Ezrachi and 
Stucke discuss the use of the SSNDQ test by the UK competition authority in its 
review of hospital mergers.129
Just like the difficulty with applying the SSNDQ test to assess a merger’s implica-
tions on quality, the test has limitations in terms of privacy. Just like quality, privacy 
is subjective and lacks quantifiable metrics. Due to the subjectivity of consumer pref-
erences about privacy, the SSNDQ test has practical limitations for measuring a 
potential privacy degradation or the degree of privacy protection generally. The ele-
ment of subjectivity makes privacy – like quality more generally – harder to define 
124 See Margrethe Vestager speech (n 36).
125 On the currently debated concept of fairness in EU competition law, see e.g., Maurits Dolmans 
and Wanjie Lin, Fairness and Competition Law: A Fairness Paradox 4 Concurrences Review (Novem-
ber 2017); Harri Kalimo and Klaudia Majcher, The Concept of Fairness: Linking EU Competition and 
Data Protection Law in the Digital Marketplace 42 European Law Review 210 (2017).
126 This is shown in demand curves by competition economists for any market.
127 OECD Quality Report (n 103) 164.
128 Ezrachi and Stucke (n 10).
129 Ibid.
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and measure than price, which mirrors the lack of a commonly accepted analytical 
framework and consequent superficial treatment at times by competition authorities.130 
Generally, the economic analysis of privacy has evolved over time, but characterizing 
a single unifying economic theory of privacy has proven hard. This is partly due to 
privacy issues of economic relevance arising in widely diverse contexts.131
As mentioned, applying the SSNDQ test to assess privacy involves inherent dif-
ficulties, due to the subjectivity of consumer preferences about privacy and the lack 
of quantifiable metrics. However, despite the unavailability of a commonly accepted 
analytical framework for privacy, some studies on the value of personal data look at 
different methodologies to measure and estimate the monetary value of personal data.132 
Many of these studies acknowledge that while personal data is creating economic and 
social value at an increasing pace, estimating the value being generated is difficult. 
This is because not only is a huge amount of data being generated, but personal data 
is used in so many different situations for numerous purposes.133
When commenting o n the Google/DoubleClick decision, former EU Competition 
Commissioner Almunia predicted that, while the Commission had not yet at that time 
encountered a merger where it suspected that personal data could be used to breach 
EU competition law, this did not mean that it could not happen: ‘[i]n time, personal 
data may well become a competition issue.’134 Indeed, looking at where we are today, 
this prediction seems to have come true, at least conceptually. What remains to be 
seen is how this approach to privacy as an element in competition can be become 
practically operational in competition enforcement. In this regard, the next section 
considers the way forward by considering potential measuring tools for competition 
authorities to use in their assessment of privacy as a competition dimension.
V. Addressing the Challenges of Measuring Data and Privacy
To address some o f the challenges of dealing with personal data and privacy, in the 
following some relevant methodologies and estimation techniques for assigning mon-
etary values attached to personal data are discussed. The idea is that these method-
ologies for valuing personal data could be used as basis to further develop the 
economic and legal analysis of privacy and to provide a measuring tool for competi-
tion authorities with the increasing confrontation with privacy issues in competition 
cases.
Market prices for data. As noted, consumers at times assess quality using price as 
a proxy. The same logic applies to assessing the value of personal information. The 
130 Stucke and Grunes (n 108), 266.
131 For further reading on the economics of privacy, see Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R Taylor and 
Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy 52 Journal of Economic Literature 2 (2016).
132 See in particular OECD, Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies 
for Measuring Monetary Value, Digital Economy Paper No 220, 7 (2013).
133 Ibid., 2.
134 Almunia speech (n 66).
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most direct way to approach the value of personal data is probably to evaluate the 
market prices at which personal data are legitimately offered and sold. The values are 
imprecise as they only represent the price of data sold in a specific context to one 
participant and do not show the total “earnings” of the data over time. They do, how-
ever, offer a market-based measurement based on the intersection of supply and 
demand. Examples of prices for personal data in the USA can range from USD 0.50 
for a street address, USD 2 for a date of birth, USD 8 for a social security number, 
USD 3 for a driver’s license number and USD 35 for a military record.135 These are 
only estimates but give some insight into the relative market values of different pieces 
of personal data.
Financial results per data record. According to the OECD study on the econom-
ics of personal data, financial results are another principal way of assigning monetary 
value to personal data.136 Financial results include market capitalizations, revenues 
or net income per individual record. Market capitalization as an approach is suitable 
for companies whose business models are based primarily on personal data. However, 
market capitalization data leads to valuations that can fluctuate considerably. For 
example, the implied market capitalization or valuation per Facebook user fluctuated 
between USD 40 and USD 300 per user at different times between 2006 and 2012.137 
The fluctuations are influenced to a large extent by other economic factors and not 
solely by the monetary value of the underlying data.138
Revenue or net income per record/user is arguably a more stable measure of the 
annual market value of personal data. For example, Facebook and Experian, two 
companies whose business models are based on personal data, have annual revenues 
per record/user of roughly USD 4-7 per year. While imprecise, the data can serve as 
a useful point of reference. It should be noted, however, that only at the level of net 
profit per record is added economic value actually measured.139
Costs of data breach. Another approach to considering the monetary value of per-
sonal data is through an assessment of the economic costs of a data breach. This 
methodology includes measures of the cost to individuals who have their identities 
stolen or the costs to companies when a data breach occurs. The costs associated with 
the loss and misuse of personal data can give some indication of its value. A drawback 
of this approach is that reported figures vary widely.140 Moreover, it does not measure 
the value of the underlying data but rather the monetary cost of a breach on a per-
record basis. For example, the data, or data security breach concerning the Sony 
PlayStation Network and Sony Online Entertainment in 2011 resulted in the exposure 
of 103 million records. According to Sony executives, the data breach would cost the 
135 OECD, Econom ics of Personal Data (n 35), 25-27. The examples are taken from the OECD 
study at the time of writing the report (2013). 
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., 20-25.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
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company at least USD 171 million (USD 1.7 per record).141 It does not, however, 
cover loss in company reputation, brand impact and other indirect and opportunity 
costs.
Willingness to pay to protect through insurance. Another way to put an economic 
value on personal data is to understand how much someone would be willing to pay 
to protect that data in the form of insurance. This can also be seen in markets in the 
form of insurance policies to protect against identity theft. For example, the data 
broker Experian sells an identity-theft protection service called ProtectMyID for USD 
155 per annum in the USA. It is interesting to compare this figure with the mentioned 
examples of average revenue per record (USD 6.42) and market capitalization per 
record (USD 19.24) for some perspective on the difference between measures.142
Economic experiments and surveys. Another way to assign economic value to 
personal data is to conduct economic experiments and surveys that extract the price 
that companies would have to pay individuals for them to give up some of their per-
sonal information. Several experimental studies have attempted to quantify individual 
valuations of personal data in diverse contexts.143 Research in this area is still devel-
oping, as the notion of individual valuation of privacy is complex and extremely 
context-dependent, which makes it challenging to analyze in a laboratory setting.144 
However, the notion of individual valuation of privacy can also be irrational, which 
brings even more complexity to the issue and may require insights based on behav-
ioural economics.
Moreover, according to research results, there is a difference between individual 
valuation of personal data and individual valuation of privacy in the sense that people 
tend to differ with respect to their individual valuation of personal data (the amount 
of money sufficient for them to give away personal data) and their individual valua-
tion of privacy (the amount of money they are ready to spend to protect their personal 
data from disclosure). Generally, the proportion of consumers who will reject an offer 
to obtain money in exchange for reduced privacy is larger than the proportion of 
consumers who will accept an economically equivalent offer to pay money in 
141 Ibid.
142 It is, however, questioned whether services that offer to protect and rectify the theft of personal 
data are actually effective and therefore can be viewed as a valid instrument of measurement.
143 Numerous empirical studies focus on both the valuation of personal data and the valuation of 
privacy. Examples include Kai-Lung Hui, H-H Teo, S-Y Lee, The Value of Privacy Assurance: An 
Exploratory Field Experiment 31 MIS Quarterly 19-33 (2007); R Chellapa and RG  Sin, Personaliza-
tion Versus Privacy: An Empirical Examination of the Online Consumers’ Dilemma 6 Information 
Technology and Management 181-202 (2005); L Wathieu and A Friedman, An E mpirical Approach to 
Understanding Privacy Valuation, Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on the Economics of Informa-
tion Security (WEIS (2005); D Cvrcek et al, A Study On Th e Value Of Location Privacy, Proceedings 
of Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, 109-118 (WPES 2006); S Spiekerman, J Grossklags 
and  B Berendt, E-privacy in 2nd generation E-Commerce ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 
(EC’01) 38-47 (2002).
144 However, economic experiments and procedures are well described in the literature, see e.g., JH 
Kagel and A E Roth, The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton University Press, 1997) .
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exchange for protection of privacy.145 According to Hui and Png, the difference 
between the individual valuation of personal data and the valuation of privacy could 
help explain some of the disparate findings from empirical studies.146
Empirical studies also show that both the valuation of privacy and the valuation 
of personal data are sensitive to contextual effects. Studies suggest that even suppos-
edly privacy conscious individuals are likely to share their personally sensitive infor-
mation with strangers.147 A strict application of the economics principle of “revealed 
preferences” would invite the conclusion that people do not care about their privacy 
or their personal data.148 Efforts to explain this inconsistency involve using techniques 
developed by behavioural economics that weigh in and take into account relevant 
context, psychological and individual motives in economic settings. Studies based on 
behavioural economics reveal how significantly the valuation of privacy and the 
valuation of personal data can be affected by contextual effects that arguably should 
play a limited role in decision making.149 These studies also demonstrate the complex-
ity of individual privacy preferences by examining the underlying privacy and per-
sonal data valuations, finding that these are not normally or uniformly distributed, but 
clustered around extremes and focal points.150
It should be acknowledged that these different approaches for assigning monetary 
values to personal data and the economics of personal data and privacy have some 
caveats or limitations. Importantly, the methodologies reflect a purely monetary per-
spective in that they do not take into account the indirect impact of use of personal 
data on the economy or society. Further, they produce monetary estimates of values 
that are context dependent, and they may lead to biased results if relying solely on 
one specific approach. In addition, challenges arise with concepts and definitions, due 
to inherent difficulties in determining precisely what amounts to personal data, and 
in comparing different proxies for personal data such as “records” or “users.”151
Markets are likely to evolve in which individuals control and sell their own data. 
As mentioned, online users and consumers generally are more and more waking up 
to how technology companies with data-driven businesses are using and monetizing 
online user data in ways that which may raise privacy risks. New developments are 
on the horizon that could produce novel valuations of personal data and shed further 
light on their market valuations. For example, some firms are now offering “data 
lockers”. These allow users to contribute and edit the data they are willing to share 
145 Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K Jo hn, and George Loewenstein, What is Privacy Worth? 42 The 
Journal of Legal Studies 249-274 (2013).
146 Kai-Lung Hui and IPL Png, The Eco nomics of Privacy in T Hendershott (ed), Handbook on 
Economics and Information Systems, 471-498 (Amsterdam, 2006).
147 Spiekerman et al (n 146), 38-47.
148 See e.g., Paul Rubin and Thomas Lenard, Privacy and the Commercial Use of Personal Infor-
mation (Springer 2002).
149 OECD Economics of Personal Data (n 135) 30, citing studies by Norbert Schwarz, Self-reports: 
How  the Questions Shape the Answers 54 American Psychologist (1999); Acquisti et al (n 148), 249-
274.
150 Acquisti et al (n 148), 249-274.
151 OECD Economics of Personal Data (n 135), 4-5.
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with third parties in exchange for a portion of the proceeds when their data is sold.152 
These data lockers could potentially improve transparency about how data is col-
lected, sold and used. Users may be willing to share more personal data if they feel 
they have more control over how it is used and receive a clear economic or social 
benefit in exchange for sharing. Consequently, sales prices through “data lockers” 
might become a key method for valuing personal information and privacy.153 This is 
a new area and although it is unclear if data lockers will emerge with viable business 
models, this is an area worth following up in the privacy context.
Further, the EU’s proposal on digital taxation reflects some elements that bear 
interesting similarities to the discussion on measuring privacy harm by looking at the 
number of users. In the EU tax reform proposal, the Commission proposes new meas-
ures to ensure that digital business activities are taxed fairly in the EU.154 The initia-
tive aims to reform corporate tax rules so that profits are registered and taxed where 
businesses have significant interaction with users through digital channels. Conse-
quently, one of the criteria for considering a digital platform as having a taxable 
“digital presence” or a virtual permanent establishment in an EU Member State is 
that it has more than 100,000 users in a Member State in a taxable year. (Another 
alternative criterion is that a digital platform has more than 3000 business contracts 
for digital services created between the company and business users in a taxable year.)
Further to the question of valuation of personal data, it should be noted that related 
issues often arise in the context of two-sided advertising supported markets, which 
brings about challenges in terms of how to balance possible benefits on the “paid” 
advertising side of the market against harms on the “free” consumer side of the mar-
ket, as seen in Facebook/WhatsApp and Google/DoubleClick. What makes it even 
more difficult is that situations arise in the digital economy where protection of pri-
vacy can both enhance and detract from individual and societal welfare.155 Another 
challenge is that consumers’ ability to make informed decisions about their personal 
information and privacy is hindered because they are often in a position of imperfect 
information about when their data is collected, for what purpose, and with what con-
sequences.156 In addition, consumers’ concern for their data protection can also be 
distorted by other factors, such as the power of defaults157 and the “free effect”.158
The phenomena highlighted and discussed above may contribute to the existing 
privacy paradox, namely that while many users are concerned about privacy, few 
152 Ibid., 5.
153 Ibid.
154 Commission press release, ‘Digital Taxation: Commission Proposes New Measures to Ensure 
That All Companies Pay Fair Tax in the EU’ (Brussels, 21 March 2018).
155 Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R Taylor and Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy 52 Journal 
of Economic Literature 2 (2016).
156 Ibid.
157 Ezrachi and Stucke (2016) (n 10), 35. 
158 Gal and Rubinfeld (n 109), 530.
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actually act on those concerns.159 Nevertheless, those few privacy-aware consumers 
that do value data protection are enough to raise competitive concerns. As mentioned, 
privacy is subjective, meaning that not all consumers value the same things, and pri-
vacy might affect marginal consumers who are those to keep market power in check.160 
In this context, it is noteworthy that consumers’ views on the value of personal data 
may be shifting in the wake of the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal and users 
are likely becoming more attentive to privacy, and perhaps the Cambridge Analytica 
affair may even be remembered as the beginning of a larger reckoning. Even Face-
book’s CEO Marc Zuckerberg has said that new regulation is “inevitable.”161
Further to the privacy paradox, which reflects irrational consumer behaviour, con-
sumers can behave irrationally in other ways in the context of digital markets, often 
because they are lured by free services, the so called free effect.162 For example, the 
power of default, an idea stemming from behavioural economics, makes consumers 
stick to the default option not just due to the practices of the dominant company but 
also because of an artificial lock-in effect. This means that consumers sometimes 
prefer to stick to the default option, even if faced with better or higher quality alterna-
tive options, because they feel comfortable and do not want to experience additional 
learning costs.163 This phenomenon can also be referred to as consumers experiencing 
“high switching costs”.164 A key point with the power of the default option is that this 
notion from behavioural economics, which often stands in contrast to the approach 
of traditional law and economics, can help explain the market power of dominant 
companies in online markets and the presence of barriers to entry. Dan Ariely, an 
expert in applied behavioural economics, captures the problem with privacy and the 
irrational behaviour of consumers in the following question:
Wouldn’t economics make a lot more sense if it were based on how people actu-
ally behave, instead of how they should behave?165
159 Francisco Costa-Cabral and Orla Lynskey, Family Ties: The Intersection Between Data Protec-
tion and Competition in EU Law 54 Common Market Law Rev 28 (2017).
160 Ibid., 28.
161 Aaron Pressman, ‘Facebook Can’t Fix t his Problem Alone’ in Fortune (20 April 2018) <http://
fortune.com/2018/04/20/facebook-data-privacy-problem-fix/> accessed 5 March 2019.
162 Gal and Rubinfeld (n 109), 530.
163 E.g., consider the current Google Android case in the EU. Commission Decision of 18 July 
2018 relating to proceedings under Art. 102 TFEU and Art. 54 Agreement on the European Economic 
Area AT.40099.
164 On switching costs, see e.g., Aaron S Edlin and Robert G Harris, The Role of Swi cthing Costs 
in Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison of Microsoft and Google 15 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 
169-213 (2013).
165 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (HarperCol-
lins, New York, 2008).
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VI. Conclusions
This article has highlighted the increasing role and importance of data and privacy in 
competition law, especially in the area of merger control considering the number of 
data-driven acquisitions in digital markets. The aim of this article is to contribute to 
the ongoing debate concerning the complex relationship between the two legal areas 
of competition and data protection. Many of the issues raised here relate to broader 
policy questions and themes that go beyond the scope of this brief article and deserve 
further research.166 Suffice to say here that with increasing attention devoted to the 
competition-privacy interface, not only in academia but also by the leading competi-
tion authorities, the conventional hard line between competition law and privacy may 
be softening and there is a clear need to develop adequate policy responses.
With the rise of data-driven mergers, competition authorities will increasingly have 
to confront data and privacy implications in their competitive assessment. The con-
ditional Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision, the developments concerning privacy 
degradation in the case of Facebook, and the recent Apple/Shazam merger decision, 
all go to support the observation that competition enforcers are becoming more sen-
sitive to the role of data and privacy protection in their competition review. While the 
overall principles may be similar for the competitive assessment of data-driven merg-
ers, they will require more sophisticated analysis of the nature of transactions with 
customers and the effects of two- or multisided markets to identify the actual price 
paid in terms of lost privacy.
To address some of these challenges of dealing with personal data and privacy, 
this article points to some relevant methodologies to estimate or assign monetary 
values to personal data with the idea that such methods could be used as basis to fur-
ther develop the economic and legal analysis of privacy with the ultimate aim of 
creating a measuring tool for competition authorities. In practice, however, this will 
likely be a challenging task and may necessitate both an intellectual and policy shift 
to adequately take into consideration and effectively measure the ever-important non-
price elements of competition. This article hopefully offers food for thought on the 
way.
166 The author explores this topic in a paper EU Competition Policy for the Digital Economy, forth-
coming in issue 24.3 of  in Columbia Journal of European Law, and as part of her doctoral thesis in law.
